placed upon the Johannesburg Stock Exchange itself, and on the courts. 19 The delayed publication of price-sensitive information relating to listed securities was arguably the most common form of disclosure-based market manipulation in South
Africa. 20 The publication of ambiguous information, tip-offs (tipping) and rumours also created another challenge for the enforcement authorities.
16
In spite of the paucity of convictions and settlements in civil and criminal cases involving market abuse, the legislature has managed to raise the standards of practice in South African financial markets up to a level that would make them comparable with the highest standards of similar markets in the developed world and international best practice, by enacting some definitions as well as civil and administrative sanctions against market abuse. provisions. 30 Prejudiced persons had two years to institute a claim against any person who violated the relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Control Act. 31 In addition, the Registrar of Financial Institutions had the responsibility of instituting claims on behalf of all the prejudiced persons. 32 In order to get compensation in such instances, the burden of proof was on the claimant to prove that the loss he had suffered was caused by the offender's market manipulative actions. The paucity of successful settlements and prosecutions of market manipulation cases was allegedly caused by the failure on the part of the South African legislature to enact a more appropriate anti-market abuse enforcement framework. 36 Notably, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange's enforcement responsibility was not clearly defined, especially in the Stock Exchanges Control Act. The Stock Exchanges Control Act stated only that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange had the responsibility of policing market manipulation provisions without expressly and clearly defining its powers and functions. 37 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the The term "insider trading" was used only in relation to securities listed on a regulated market and it applied only to directors or officers of a company. Moreover, the concept of "insider Moreover, the maximum sentence was considerably increased. Persons convicted of insider trading were liable to pay the relevant enforcement authorities a fine of R500 000, or to be imprisoned for a period not exceeding ten years, or both.
Notwithstanding the efforts on the part of the legislature to outlaw insider trading, the provisions of the Companies Amendment Act were still seriously flawed. As a result, the insider trading prohibition under the Companies Amendment Act never came into operation and will therefore not be discussed in detail. It was replaced by a new insider trading prohibition that was introduced in terms of the Second
Companies Amendment Act. The prohibition on insider trading was expressly made applicable to all dealings in securities. The term "securities" was defined to include company shares as well as The maximum sentence for insider trading was a fine of R500 000, or imprisonment for a period of ten years, or both. In spite of these significant changes, the enforcement of insider trading remained problematic in that no person was 
The regulation of insider trading in terms of the Insider Trading Act

of 1998
A novel regime aimed at resolving the tenacious insider trading problem in South Africa was introduced by the Insider Trading Act. 106 The Insider Trading Act repealed and replaced the relevant provisions of the Companies Act in an effort to broaden the scope of the prohibition of insider trading. In addition to treating insider trading as a criminal offence, an attempt was made to provide more appropriate civil remedies to those who would suffer prejudice as a result of insider trading activities.
Furthermore, more severe criminal sanctions were introduced and the insider trading ban was extended to a wide spectrum of financial instruments other than securities of companies. 107 The provisions of the Insider Trading Act, relating to enforcement and the role of the enforcement authorities are analysed below. This analysis is divided into four parts. Firstly, the provisions that relate to the key concepts of the insider trading prohibition are briefly discussed. Secondly, the provisions that deal with the enforcement of the insider trading sanctions and penalties are examined.
Thirdly, a closer look is taken at the roles of the enforcement authorities. Lastly, the enforcement methods adopted under the Insider Trading Act are discussed.
The definition of selected key terms and concepts under the Insider Trading
Act 135 of 1998
The term "insider" was defined as an individual who has inside information through being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities or financial instruments to which the inside information relates or who has access to such information by virtue of his employment, office or profession, or who knew that the direct or indirect source of the inside information was a director, employee or shareholder as contemplated in the Insider Trading Act. Inside information was defined as specific or precise information which had not been made public and which was obtained or learned by an individual as an insider and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a material effect on the price or value of any securities or financial instruments.
111
Only accurate and factual non-public inside information would fall in the ambit of the definition. 112 Information therefore had to meet four requirements to qualify as inside information in terms of the Insider Trading Act. Firstly, the information was required to be factually specific or precise. Inaccurate and any unconfirmed information, speculation about whether information might be true, rumours or promises were excluded. Trading on the basis of rumours or speculation about the value of securities or financial instruments could, however, still occur and harm ignorant outsiders. The terms "specific" or "precise" were not defined and it was left to the courts to determine what would constitute specific or precise information. Although it can be assumed that all persons should have a broad understanding of the general 109
In this regard, the pool of individuals who could become insiders was now large and included not only directors, employees and advisors but also many others, like advertising and production professionals engaged to compile and publish inside information for printing. Thirdly, the information must not have been made public, as superficially stipulated in the Insider Trading Act. 115 The term "publication" was not statutorily defined, but a number of ways in which the non-public inside information was deemed to have been published were enumerated. 116 Lastly, the non-public inside information was required to be likely to have a material effect on the price or value of the securities 117 or financial instruments 118 after having been made public. The term "material effect"
was not defined. Moreover, although some of the elements of the insider trading offence were described, the concept of "insider trading" was not statutorily and This prohibition was aimed at discouraging persons who were privy to non-public price-sensitive information to incite others to deal in or to refrain from dealing in securities or financial instruments to the detriment of innocent (outside) 
Evaluation of the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition prior to 2004
The pioneering provisions in the Companies Act (including all its amendments) were not only inconsistent for the purposes of combating insider trading, but were also not properly enforced. 155 Notably, the enforcement approaches adopted under the Companies Act as amended were few and restricted to criminal sanctions.
156 By enacting criminal penalties, it appears the legislature relied mainly on the policy goal of deterrence, which failed to discourage some persons from practising insider trading. 157 Other enforcement approaches such as civil sanctions, bounty rewards and whistle-blowing were not considered.
152
S 82(9) read with s 79 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 91 (9) 
Concluding remarks
It is clear that the various market abuse laws enacted in South Africa were aimed mainly at improving the regulation of market manipulation and insider trading in order inter alia to restore public investor confidence in our financial markets. Several amendments to the market abuse legislation were introduced from time to time in a bid to effectively combat market abuse practices in South Africa. Nonetheless, in relation to this, it has been shown that both the Stock Exchanges Control Act and Act's failure to provide adequate definitions of some insider trading terms such as "material effect", "insider trading", "inside information", "specific" or "precise" and "publication" has contributed to the inconsistent enforcement of its provisions. See the related comments in para 3.5 above.
177
See the related comments in para 3.4.1 above.
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See the related comments in para 3.4.3 above.
180
See the related comments in para 3.4.3 above; see further the JSE 2013 http://www.jse.co.za/Libraries/JSE_Regulatory_Environment_Insider_Trading/InsiderTrading_Bo oklet.sflb.ashx 1-26.
provisions. It is hoped that the recommendations made in this article will be utilised by the relevant stakeholders in future to combat market abuse. 
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